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NAVIGATING THE MINEFIELD:
COPYRIGHT, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY &
CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION

The fact that federal intellectual property laws, such as the
Copyright Act,' are required to coexist with certain state laws,
such as the right of publicity, creates many potential conflicts that
implicate public policy matters as well as the rights of individuals.
When contract law is incorporated, the level of complexity
increases even further. Contracts, along with the right of publicity,
can dilute copyrights in ways that defeat their purpose.' It is
important to keep in mind throughout the following analysis that
copyright law was intended to promote expression and creativity
for the public first and foremost, and that protecting the right of
copyright owners and the parties who contributed to a work is an
important, but secondary concern.'
Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc.' is an ideal study for this type of

problem. This case involves the intersection of many intellectual
property law doctrines, and therefore paints an accurate picture of
the current law of conflict preemption in this field, as well as
serving as a jumping off point for discussing future approaches. In
Facenda, the Third Circuit discusses trademark, copyright, First
Amendment, right of publicity, false endorsement, and contract
1. Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in

scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
2. See generally Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67

MD. L. REv. 616 (2008) (arguing for the pre-emption of contracts by federal law
if the contract waives certain statutory rights designed to benefit the public
rather than the individual parties to the contract).
3. Id. at 617 (describing the balance between these parties as being
"necessary to copyright's purpose of fostering the creation and dissemination of
expression") (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 8.
4. Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008).
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law doctrines. Of these, the primary focus of this article will be
the right of publicity, copyright law, and how contract law
influences the conflict between the two. Because the court uses a
commercial speech analysis akin to First Amendment doctrine, this
section of the opinion will be discussed as well.'
Section II of this article will discuss the case law and scholarly
opinions regarding the problem of the copyright and right of
publicity versus contracts conflict, focusing on the two approaches
that were used by the Third Circuit in Facenda, as well as a pure
contract preemption approach by Professor Christina Bohannan.6
Section III of this article discusses the Facenda case in detail,
focusing on the analysis of copyright law, right of publicity, and
contracts. The analysis in Section IV(A) focuses on the Third
Circuit's approach to express copyright preemption of Facenda's
right to publicity claim based on the language of the Copyright Act
itself, incorporating the "additional element" test currently used by
most courts.7 It will then explain its inapplicability to this type of
conflict.8
Section IV(B) will demonstrate how the court's
analysis, based on a pure conflict-preemption argument rooted in
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, is a better approach, but
still falls short of an ideal test for resolving these problems. 9 This
approach considers what type of contract the parties entered into in
determining whether the claim based on the contract should be
preempted.'° Section IV(C) will discuss another approach heavily
rooted in the policy of the Copyright Act that applies a contractual
waiver of statutory rights analysis, while IV(D) will explain why
this is preferable to the court's approach.
In cases such as Facenda, where parties are competing for
conflicting intellectual property rights, a legal test that involves the
public policy rationale for copyrights at its core and protects all
types of expression equally is required. By focusing on the
5. Id. at 1016-18 (analyzing the films in question as commercial speech).
6. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID

NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §

1.01[B][3][a] (2008) ("To avoid contract law swallowing up all of copyright
doctrine, private agreements cannot be enforced to the extent that they utterly
subvert copyright's 'delicate balance."').
7. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1027.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 1028.
10. Id. at 1028-1030.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/5
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commercial nature of the targeted work and the nature of the
contract entered into by the parties in determining preemption, the
Facenda court sets a troubling precedent. This precedent tips the
scale too far in favor of individual and state law rights, thus
striking at the core of the purpose of copyright, which has always
been to promote every type of expression for the entire public.
II.BACKGROUND
The law in the area of copyright preemption and right of
publicity is uneven. Courts are split on the delicate balance of
rights required to be preserved by their decisions." The separate
analysis of contract preemption by copyright law has an equally
conflicted history when examined on its own, and when the two
collide, the confusion increases exponentially. To make sense of
this area of law, it is necessary to first examine copyright law and
the right of publicity separately, and reconcile these doctrines
through the law of preemption. After this discussion, pure contract
preemption will be discussed, as well as a brief overview of the
treatment of commercial speech under the First Amendment.
A. CopyrightPreemption of Right of Publicity Claims
The history of copyright preemption of state law right of
publicity claims is examined here by focusing on the elements and
purpose of copyright law, elements of the state law right of
publicity, and the law of preemption and the test used by courts to
apply this doctrine.
1. Purpose and Overview of CopyrightLaw
Derived from the Constitutional provision known as the
copyright clause, the purpose of copyrights is "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."' 2 The Copyright Act is
based on this Constitutional power. Sections 102 and 103 of the
11. See generally Bohannan, supra note 2 (comparing

treatment and

consequences of the "extra element" test with that of considering equivalence
directly).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 8.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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United States Code define the statutory scope of subject matter
that is protected." Section 102 protects an enumerated set of
works: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8)
architectural works. 14 Most important for the discussion at hand is
§ 103, which protects "compilations and derivative works."15
In addition to specifying the subject matter under copyright, the
statute also enumerates uses of which the owner has an exclusive
right. 16 Important for our analysis is Section 106, which gives the
owner of the copyright the right to reproduce the copyrighted work
and to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work. '7

2. The Spectrum of Rights Involved in the Right of Publicity
Because the state law right of publicity statute at issue in
Facenda is Pennsylvania law, it is necessary to examine this
particular permutation of the right of publicity doctrine.' 8 The
Pennsylvania statute reads "[a]ny natural person whose name or
likeness has commercial value and is used for any commercial or
advertising purpose" without consent may sue for an injunction
and damages.' 9 However, in the cases that follow, courts have
alternately expanded this right and limited it through cases falling
at polar opposite ends of the spectrum, both through modification
of the doctrine itself and through federal preemption, including
preemption by copyright. 2

State law rights of publicity have expanded in recent years. 2' In
13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2006).

14. § 102(a).

15. § 103.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
17. § 106(1)-(2).
18. Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1027 (3d Cir. 2008).
19. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316(a) (West 2002).
20. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997); White
v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
21. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1999) (denial
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/5
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White v. Samsung ElectronicsAmerica, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held
that the right of publicity allowed by California law reached
beyond protecting a person's "name, voice, signature, or likeness"
and expanded it to something that simply evoked the celebrity
image in the public's mind.22 In his dissent, Judge Kozinski
forcefully argued that this infringes the First Amendment rights of
the public, stating "[this is] a speech restriction unparalleled in
First Amendment law.

23

The primary case that brings this analysis squarely into the
realm of copyright preemption is Wendt v. Host International,Inc.,
in which the Ninth Circuit, following White, held that two actors,
George Wendt and John Ratzenberger, had a right to enjoin
Paramount, the defendant, from making derivative works (actual
robots who looked like the actors for the purpose of promoting an
airport bar) based on their characters from the popular sitcom
Cheers.24 The defendants were denied the value of their copyright
in favor of the plaintiffs state law claim.

25

The court held that a

jury could find that the robots used to depict the characters were
"sufficiently like" Wendt and Ratzenberger, and regardless of the
defendant's copyright, the jury could decide the statutory right of
publicity claim.26 Judge Kozinski again submitted a strong
dissent, stating that, "Plaintiffs are using California law to stop
Host from displaying a copyrighted work in Kansas City and
Cleveland. Why California should set the national standard for
what is a permissible use of a licensed derivative work is beyond
me."27
At the opposite end of the spectrum lies the Seventh Circuit,
which decided in Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League
BaseballPlayersAssociation, that Major League Baseball players'
rights of publicity claims were preempted by the Club's copyright
of a rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, J, dissenting) (chastising the panel for
broadening the right of publicity to such a point that it conflicts with copyright
law).
22. White v Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993)

(denial of a rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 1519.
24. See generally Wendt, 125 F.3d 806.

25. See id. at 809.
26. Id. at 810.
27. Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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in the telecasts of the baseball games in which the players played.28
This case is squarely at odds with Wendt and White, as noted by
Judge Kozinski.29
The Seventh Circuit used an express
preemption analysis.
The rule the court used in deciding
equivalence was whether "a right in a work that is conferred by
state law is equivalent to the right to perform a telecast of a work if
the state-law right is infringed merely by broadcasting the work."3
It is noteworthy that the "additional element"'" test is not applied,
likely because the court realized its deficiencies and the outcome
to which it would lead. This test requires that a state law not be
preempted if there is an additional element to the cause of action
beyond what is protected by the Copyright Act.32 The Seventh
Circuit's approach would lead to preemption in most cases merely
if an express right granted by copyright is infringed, thus severely
limiting right of publicity claims.
3. The Law of Preemption
The Copyright Act expressly lays out parameters for preemption
in section 301.3" It states,
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright . . . in works of authorship that are
28. Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d

663, 675 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[The players'] performances are fixed in tangible
form, and any property rights in the performances that are equivalent to any of
the rights encompassed in a copyright are preempted.").
29. See Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1287 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). Compare Balt.
Orioles, 805 F.2d at 679 (holding that in the event of competing intellectual
property doctrines, federal copyright law wins out) with Wendt, 125 F.3d at 809

(holding strongly in favor of the right to publicity), and White v. Samsung
Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that copyright

law was subservient to the state claims of right of publicity in situations that
involved similar conflicts).
30. Balt. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 677.

31. See id. at 678. It is noteworthy that the court did not ask for an additional
element in the state law claim in order for it to succeed, but rather focused on
whether the basic overall rights protected were the same.
32. Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc. 542 F.3d 1007, 1027 (3d Cir. 2008).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006)
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/5
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fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified
by sections 102 and 103

.

.

.

are governed

exclusively by this title."
Thus, what is required for preemption is a right that is equivalent
to one of the enumerated rights protected by the Copyright Act,
and a work that fall under the subject matter of copyright. Section
301(b)(1) of the Copyright Act states that "Nothing in this title
annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or
statutes of any State" with respect to works that do not fall under
the specified subject matter.35 In applying this test, courts often
use the "additional element" approach described above. 36 This test
requires that an additional element not protected by copyright law
be present in the state law cause of action.37 If this test is met, then
the equivalence prong is not satisfied for the state law right to be
preempted.38
B. The Law of Conflict Preemptionof Contracts
Courts have traditionally been unreceptive to the preemption of
contracts. 39 This is because, according to Professor Bohannan, the
nature of contracts, although enforced by state law, reflects private
ordering and not a state obligation.4" One approach to combat the
conflict of copyright and contract is that of copyright misuse.4
Professor Bohannan suggests that preemption is a better solution,
however, because it "prevents enforcement of license agreements
that are contrary to copyright policy without invalidating the
copyright as a whole."42 Another possible solution proposed is the
34. § 301(a)
35. § 301(b)(1)
36. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1027 (citing Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985, 991-

93 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Bohannan, supra note 2, at 617

40. Id.
41. Id. at 618 (arguing that misuse usually only comes into play when the
contract amounts to something akin to an antitrust law violation).
42. Id. at 619.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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waiver doctrine, holding that a waiver of statutory rights is
enforceable "(1) if it is clear and unmistakable, and (2) purports to
waive statutory rights under the Copyright Act that protect
individual rather than public interests."43
C. Commercial Speech
An important First Amendment Doctrine that is discussed by the
Third Circuit is that of the treatment of commercial speech." The
Supreme Court has held that commercial speech is not fully
protected when it "does no more than propose a commercial
transaction."45
But when commercial and non-commercial
elements are mixed, a different conclusion is reached.46 If this is
the case, this hybrid form of speech is "fully protected."47
Although not the primary focus of this article, the
commercial/non-commercial speech is rudimentary to the Third
Circuit's disposition of the copyright and right of publicity claims.
III. THE OPINION IN FACENDA v. NFL FILMS

A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
John Facenda was a famous announcer for NFL films, narrating
films about notable football games.48 At first he worked under an
oral agreement, receiving a fee per program in which his voice was
recorded." Shortly before his death, he signed a release contract
stating that the NFL shall enjoy "unequivocal rights" to use the
recorded sequences, except in situations that "constitute an
endorsement of any product or service."5 Facenda died of cancer
43. Id. at 619-20.
44. Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc. 542 F.3d 1007, 1016-18 (3d Cir. 2008).
45. Id. at 1016 (quoting United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,
409 (2001)).
46. Id. at 1016-17.
47. Id. (quoting Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
796 (1988)).
48. Id. at 1011.
49. Id. at 1012.
50. Facenda,542 F.3d at 1012. The standard release stated:
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/5
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in 1984."
In 2006, in preparation for the annual release of the video game
"Madden NFL 06," NFL Films produced "The Making of Madden
NFL 06," a short film that was shown eight times in a three-day
span before the game was to come out.12 The film featured
interviews with NFL players and the game's producers, and
contained other opinions regarding the realism of the graphics and
its close parallels to real NFL football. 3 This program contained
much information that was also disseminated in other news reports
about the game, but without any of the negative commentary
contained in those other reports.54 The NFL also had a license
with EA Sports, the makers of the game, which gave the NFL
royalty revenue in exchange for EA Sports' use of NFL
intellectual property. 5
The film in question used Facenda's voice, in particular three
clips: (1) "Pro Football, the game for the ear and the eye"; (2)
"This sport is more than spectacle, it is a game for all seasons";
and (3) "X's and O's on the blackboard are translated into
aggression on the field."56 None of these clips were altered as to
content, but they were filtered to sound more like a computerized
voice.57

At trial, Facenda's estate sued for false endorsement under the
Lanham Act and for unauthorized use of name or likeness under

In consideration of [blank space with dollar sign], I
hereby grant to NFL Films, Inc., the unequivocal
rights to use the audio and visual film sequences
recorded of me, or any part of them, on a worldwide
basis, in perpetuity and by whatever media or manner
NFL Films Inc., sees fit, provided, however, such use
does not constitute an endorsement of any product or
service.
Facenda, v. NFL Films, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 491, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2007), vacated
by 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008).
51. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1012.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Facenda. 542 F.3d at 1012.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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Pennsylvania law. 8 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of Facenda's Estate on both the false endorsement claim
and the right of publicity claim. 9 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the judgment on the Lanham Act, but
affirmed summary judgment for the right of publicity action.6"
B. The Third Circuit'sAnalysis
The focus here will be on the right of publicity claim, because it
is the cause of action that directly conflicts with the Copyright Act.
The Third Circuit first employed an express preemption analysis.
It found under the equivalence, or "additional element" prong of
the test, that the Pennsylvania right of publicity statute contained
the extra element requiring that the person's voice or likeness have
"commercial value." Therefore, it did not protect a right that is
equivalent to one protected by the Copyright Act.6' As for the
copyrightable subject matter prong, it held that Facenda's voice
was not fixed in a tangible medium of expression, as is expressly
required by the Copyright Act, and therefore the state law right of
publicity claim was not being asserted to protect copyrightable
subject matter.62 With both prongs of the test decided in favor of
the state law, the Pennsylvania right of publicity claim survived.
Unlike previous courts that have been required to decide the
conflict preemption issue, the Third Circuit in Facenda took its
analysis further. It analyzed the conflict here as one of "conflict
preemption," pitting state law against federal law, with a contract
thrown into the mix.63 A two-pronged approach was employed.64
First, the court decided that Facenda's voice was used in a
commercial work because "The Making of Madden NFL 06" was
not a documentary but an advertisement."65 Secondly, the court
held that the initial agreement between Facenda and the NFL,

58. Id. at 1012-13.
59. Id. at 1013.

60. Id.
at 1011.
61. Id. at 1027.

62. Id.
63. See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1028.
64. Id. at 1029-31.
65. Id. at 1030.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/5

10

Lano: Navigating the Minefield: Copyright, the Right of Publicity, and

NA VIGA TING THE MINEFIELD

2008]

before the clips were ever recorded, was not to make an
advertisement, but rather to make a documentary, and therefore the
state law claim of right of publicity was stronger because the NFL
used Facenda's name and likeness for commercial purposes
without his consent.66 Applying this test, the court reached the
same conclusion as it did under the express preemption test, it
ruled in favor of state law.
Despite holding this way, the court provided a warning to future
courts that decide this issue, stating that,
[d]espite our holding, we emphasize that courts
must circumscribe the right of publicity so that
musicians, actors, and other voice artists do not get
a right that extends beyond commercial
advertisements to other works of artistic expression.
If courts failed to do so, then every record contract
or movie contract would no longer suffice to
authorize record companies and movie studios to
distribute their works.67

IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A
DIFFERENT OUTCOME

This section focuses on the two approaches the Third Circuit
used in deciding whether Facenda's right of publicity action was
preempted by Copyright Law, and describes in detail an alternative
approach for solving the problem, in this case leading to a contrary
result. Facenda not only involves complicated issues of law, but
as this section will discuss, the facts of the case are problematic for
analysis, and muddy the water even further. There are many issues
in Facenda, and although the court does not tie some of them
together, this article will attempt to construct the court's complete
view of the copyright preemption issue by taking a look at how the
court resolved other issues, such as right of publicity standing on
its own and its First Amendment analysis.68 It will be shown that
66. Id. at 1031.

67. Id. at 1032.
68. See id. This opinion interweaves multiple doctrines of intellectual
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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the traditional approach should be rejected in favor of a test that
favors not only the letter, but also the policy, behind copyright
preemption.
A. The "AdditionalElement" Test Usedfor Express Copyright
Preemption is Unworkable.
The Third Circuit here applies the traditional "additional
element" test to the copyright preemption claim of right of
publicity.69 This invokes the express preemption provision in the
Copyright Act itself, which provides,
All legal or equitable rights that [1] are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in [2]
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103 ... are governed exclusively by this title.70
In addition to adhering to the statutory language, the court
requires that there be an "additional element" required in the state
law claim beyond what is required to state a cause of action for
copyright infringement.71 In adhering to this approach, the court
clings to a test that has proven unworkable in similar copyright
preemption of state law right of publicity claims, and is ill-suited
to the issues involved in Facendaand similar cases.
The test is inadequate in two respects. First, it fails to take into
account the competing interests
involved,
completely
subordinating the defendant's copyright to the right of publicity
claim if there is but one additional element to the right of publicity
claim not protected under copyright law. Secondly, it fails
because the court dissected Facenda's voice from the overall
property law, as well as other competing principles. Analysis will show that
certain inquires the court undertakes, although separate from copyright
preemption analysis, are nonetheless relevant.
69. Facenda,542 F.3d at 1027.
70. Id. at 1026 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006)) (omission in original).
71. Id. at 1027.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/5
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copyrightable sound clips, clips the court stated earlier fell under
copyright protection, and therefore the "copyrightable subject
matter" prong of the test incorrectly favored the plaintiffs.72 In
doing so, the Third Circuit incorrectly relied upon "vocal
imitation" cases, with distinct fact patterns that were different from
the facts of Facenda's case. 3
1. Competing Interests
If the express preemption additional element test were applied as
it was in Facenda, copyrights would be severely diluted.74 In
Wendt, which involved television characters in a copyrighted sitcom, the court held that the actor's right of publicity was not
preempted by copyright law.75 In his vigorous dissent, Judge
Kozinski raised an argument based on the "dormant Copyright
Clause, which preempts state intellectual property laws to the
extent they 'prejudice the interests of other States."' 6 In this way,
California law would be able to set the standard for other states in
determining the extent of the statutory right to make derivative
works under the Copyright Act.77 In Facenda, if the analysis
stopped here and there was no implied conflict preemption section
of the opinion, the Pennsylvania right of publicity statute would be
able to determine the scope of copyright protection in other states
by deciding who could or could not view "The Making of Madden
72. Id. at 1026 (stating that the clips were "derivative works" expressly

protected by copyright law).
73. Id. at 1027, 1028; see generally Midler v. Ford Motor Co. 849 F.2d 460

(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that because the sound of someone's voice is not
"fixed" it cannot be copyrighted). The court here acknowledges the factual
distinction between vocal imitation cases and the case here, involving Facenda's
actual voice, but does not discuss it until the implied conflict preemption
analysis is undertaken. See Facenda, 542 F.3d. at 1028.
74. See generally Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1285-87 (9th Cir.

1999) (denial of a rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Copyright or
not copyright, anyone who wants to use a figure, statue, robot, drawing or poster
that reminds the public of [the plaintiffs] must first obtain (and pay for) their
consent.

This cannot be squared with the right of the copyright holder to

recreate [the characters] however it sees fit.").
75. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
76. Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinksi, J., dissenting).

77. See id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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NFL 06." As Judge Kozinski's opinion suggests, this would
undermine the policy behind the Copyright Act by stifling a
particular type of derivative work expressly authorized by the
federal statute.
2. The Dormant Copyright Clause Concern is Especially
PronouncedBecause, as the Court Applies the Test, Right of
Publicity Wins Every Time.
Even if the equivalence prong of the two-part test is applied as
the court does in Facenda,there is still room for the court to come
out in favor of copyright preemption in other cases.78 The real
problem lies in the "copyrightable subject matter" prong.
In applying this part of the test, the Third Circuit ignores its own
previous analysis, choosing instead to decide whether Facenda's
voice is the subject of copyright, not the sound clips that the court
previously stated were copyrightable derivative works.79 Earlier,
the court stated that "the sound clips represent Facenda's readings
of copyrighted NFL scripts, making the clips 'derivative works'
(of the scripts) in which a distinct copyright exists," leading to the
conclusion that "the NFL had the copyright in the sound clips." 8
When discussing express preemption, however, the court takes a
different approach to the clips. In deciding the question of
whether Facenda's voice falls under the subject matter of
copyright, the court wrongly tips the scale in favor of state law.8
In deciding whether Facenda's voice, rather than the clips that
contain them, is copyrightable, the court permits the chopping up
of elements contained in the work in question, here the work
consisting of the entire sound clips themselves. If this process is
78. Id. at 1286, (citing Stephano v. News Group Publ'ns, Inc. 474 N.E.2d
580, 583-84 (N.Y. 1984) (applying New York law limiting right of publicity to
protection of "name, portrait, or picture," arguably equivalent rights protected
by federal copyright law)).
79. See Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1026-28 (3d Cir. 2008).
80. Id. at 1026 (emphasis added). There are different levels of protection for
sound recordings and literary works, but they are not applicable here. The only
question relevant to the current inquiry is whether a copyright in the sound clips
existed.
81. Id. at 1027-28. The court carries over its analysis from the equivalence
prong into the copyrightable subject matter with no explanation.
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carried far enough, a court in any case could reach an element that,
separate from its whole, is not copyrightable. Copyright law does
not stand a chance.
Another troubling aspect of the Third Circuit's analysis of this
issue is its choice of precedent. It relies on Midler v. FordMotor
Co., which the court admits is a vocal imitation case.12 The Ninth
Circuit in Midler stated that in the context of vocal imitations, "a
voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not 'fixed'." 83 But
Facenda is not a vocal imitation case, as the court admits in the
subsequent part of its opinion.84 The factual differences may be
subtle, but they are important. If an individual's voice is imitated,
then it is permissible for the court to analyze the copyrightable
subject matter prong based on the voice alone, because that is the
However,
extent of the individual's interest in the work.
Facenda's actual voice was recorded; therefore he has an interest
in the copyrighted work itself, and not just the voice that is
contained therein. For the next section of the opinion regarding
conflict preemption, the court inexplicably reverts back to its
original analysis, regarding the sound clips, and not Facenda's
voice in isolation, as the "work" under copyright protection."
B. The Court's Analysis of Conflict Preemption Sets the Stagefor
a PossibleDeparturefrom the TraditionalTest.
The next section of the Third Circuit's opinion applies a more
flexible analysis, one that is much more appropriate to the situation
presented in Facenda. This is somewhat of a departure from the
reasoning of previous cases.8 6 Despite the court's decision to
apply the traditional preemption analysis in the preceding section,
it is noteworthy that the court now decides to follow a different
form of analysis, even if it does not cast the old formula aside
82. Id. at 1027 (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir.
1988))
83. Id. (quoting Midler, 849 F.2d at 462).
84. Facenda,542 F.3d at 1028.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1029; see also NIMMER, supra note 6, § 1.01[B[ [3][b][iv][1]
(arguing that many of the cases drawn upon for analysis refer to express
preemption, but the Nimmer approach involving the Supremacy Clause and
conflict preemption are more appropriate).
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altogether.
1. The Nimmer Two PartFramework
The conflict preemption analysis used by the Third Circuit is
taken almost directly from Nimmer on Copyright, a treatise that
actually includes David Nimmer's own commentary on the
District Court opinion in the Facenda case itself.87 The court
quotes Nimmer, stating that even apart from Section 301, conflict
preemption of state law by copyright exists.88 Although the
Nimmer framework is an improvement over the traditional test, it
relies on a tenuous pattern of commercial versus non-commercial
expression derived from heavily criticized cases and also cases that
have distinct factual differences from Facenda.89 Also, the way
the court decides the issue based on commercial versus noncommercial expression cuts against the purpose of the Copyright
Act.
a. Commercial/Non Commercial Expression Dichotomy
The first part of the framework involves examining how the
copyrighted work is used.9" Nimmer suggests, and the Third
Circuit adopts, a test that involves whether the copyrighted work
featuring the plaintiff's identity is used in an advertisement
capacity or in an expressive work.91 If the work was made
primarily for advertising purposes, then the scales tip in favor of
not preempting the right of publicity, based on the argument that
state law has a greater interest in matters involving advertising and
trade.9" The case used by the court to illustrate this is Seale v.
87. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1029.
88. Id. at 1028, (quoting NIMMER, supra note 6, § 1.0 1[B][3][a]).
89. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1029.

90. Id.
91. Id; see also NIMMER, supra note 6, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I].
92. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1029; see also NIMMER, supra-note 6, §
1.01[B][3][b][iv][I] (discussing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th

Cir. 1988) (voice imitation); Waits v. Frito Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1992) (same); White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th

Cir. 1992) (robot with game show hostess's likeness used in advertisement);
Wendt v. Host Int'l, 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving robots evoking sithttps://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/5
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Gramercy Pictures, which is a trademark case, not a copyright
case, and which does not include a contractual waiver of rights, as
93 The Third Circuit
does Facenda.
claims that this case was the
"inspiration" for Nimmer's framework.94 Seale involved two
claims based on the right of publicity, the first being the use of
Seale's name and likeness in a docudrama about the Black
Panthers, and the second being the use of his name on compact
discs on which he did not perform.95 The reasoning of Nimmer,
when he interpreted Seale, was that the first claim should have
been preempted because the docudrama was an expressive work,
and the second claim correctly went to trial because it was an
advertisement.9 6
As applied to Facenda,the Third Circuit found that the targeted
work was not an expressive work, but an advertisement.97 The
court seems to assume this without deciding it. Perhaps it drew
upon its analysis in a previous section of the opinion where it
decided that the twenty-two minute film about the Madden 06
video game was commercial speech.9 8 This is a weakness bought
on by the analysis of the Seale case, and it exists because the
difference between the expression in the docudrama and the
advertisement in the photograph is not as clearly defined as the
court indicated. This bright line approach was directly adopted by
the court in Facenda,and leads to a similarly muddy approach.
Adding to the confusion is the fact that the Third Circuit glossed
over a portion of the district court's opinion supporting the NFL's

com characters to promote a restaurant)). 1
93. Facenda,542 F.3d at 1029; see also Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F.
Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
94. Facenda,542 F.3d at 1029.

95. See Seale, 949 F. Supp. at 331.
96. Facenda,542 F.3d at 1029.

97. Id.
98. Id. at 1017-19. The court here, in applying a First Amendment analysis,
used a three part test to determine commercial speech, derived from U.S.
Healthcare,Inc. v. Blue Cross of GreaterPhiladelphia. Facenda, 542 F.3d at

1017-19. The factors are; (1) is the speech an advertisement; (2) does the
speech refer to a specific product or service; and (3) does the speaker have an
economic motivation for the speech. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of
Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 933 (3d Cir. 1990). It is noteworthy that the first
factor was precisely the question to be answered in the pre-emption analysis.
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case that Facenda's voice was not used for promotional purposes.99
The court states, "we would not focus on whether the program as a
whole constitutes an endorsement. Instead we would ask whether
the use of Facenda's voice within the program constitutes an
endorsement.""1 ' The court even mentioned that "[v]iewed in this
light, the District Court's rationale does not support rejecting the
defense [based on Facenda's waiver]."'' It nonetheless concluded
that the false endorsement claim at issue could go forward
regardless of this controversy.'02
This analysis is carried out in more detail in the district court's
opinion, although the court ultimately rejects the argument that
Facenda's voice within the film was promotional in nature.'0 3
There was testimony at trial regarding whether impermissible uses
were limited to the practice of splicing Facenda's words to
constitute an endorsement, or whether the clips used in their
Even though this
entirety constituted an endorsement."°4
contention may have been rejected, it still should have received
more consideration from the Third Circuit.
Next, the court cited a number of cases mentioned by Nimmer
involving instances in which the targeted work was commercial,
and when the court did not preempt the state law claims. Two of
them however, White v. Samsung Electronics, and Wendt,
discussed above, have vigorous dissents by Judge Kozinski, who
would have held that the state law claims were preempted.0 5 In
his dissent in White, Judge Kozinski states that the plaintiff now
had "an exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of
her."'0 6 White's preemption issue primarily concerned the First
99. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1023.

100. Id.
101. Id.

102. Id.
103. Facenda, v. NFL Films, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 491 (E.D. Pa. 2007),
vacated by 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008).
104. Facenda, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 499. The example used by the court was a
possible splicing of Facenda's words to state "I love Madden NFL!" Id.
105. Facenda,542 F.3d at 1029; see also Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d
1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1999) (denial of a rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512 (9th Cir.
1993) (denial of a rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting);.
106. White, 989 F.2d at 1515 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/5

18

Lano: Navigating NA
the Minefield: Copyright, the Right of Publicity, and

VIGA TING THE MINEFIELD

2008]

Amendment, and Judge Kozinski's dissent in Wendt tied it in to
Copyright cases."17 These controversial cases are almost the entire
foundation for the court's analysis of this issue.
Here, as in express preemption, the idea of state law claims
eviscerating rights provided under federal statute presents a
genuine obstacle to copyright law. Regardless of whether the
commercial/expression dichotomy the court uses is the correct one,
cases such as White and Wendt expand state law right of publicity
claims to the degree that they do threaten to devalue copyrights
such as those possessed by the NFL.
b. Nature of the ContractEntered into Between the
AdversarialPartiesin the Action
The next step in the Third Circuit's framework involves some of
the same considerations and issues as the first. Here, the contract
signed by the parties enters the analysis. The test here is whether
the nature of the initial contract between the parties is one
involving the making of an advertisement.'08 The court states "the
proper question in cases involving advertising and a contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant-such as our case-is whether
the plaintiff 'collaborated in the creation of a copyrighted
advertising product.'109

The application of this prong of the test was resolved easily by
the court in saying that "Facenda consented to participation in
films documenting NFL games, not an advertisement for a football
game video." ' But a key portion of the analysis is missing. It
could be argued that both the documentaries of NFL games and the
film allegedly "promoting" the Madden video game are both
advertisements, or neither of them are advertisements. After all,
couldn't the original films be promoting the "product" of the NFL,
which is the game of football itself?.
The argument cuts both
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1285 (Kozinski,J.,
dissenting).
Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1029-1031.
Id. at 1029 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 6, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv[II]).
Idat 1031.
Applying the three factor test regarding commercial speech to the initial

NFL game documentaries one could reach a similar result. The first factor is the
only one that is problematic, and it suffers from the same problem as the video
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ways. The authorized use of Facenda's voice for the NFL films
broadcasts and the use in the Madden 06 film could either be
commercial in nature or expressive in nature. In reality, they could
have some elements of both, but without a clear, articulated
framework for determining between the two, the court's analysis
falters because the works at issue here have so many similarities,
yet are treated as being so different.
Another argument, possibly even stronger, can be made based
on John Facenda Jr.'s testimony before the District Court. In
discussing the motives behind the contract his father signed, he
stated,
he was most likely thinking of any other film work
that he had scripts for that it wouldn't interfere with
him doing-by endorsing a product with NFL Films
that would limit him from doing product for, you
know, a thing for Ford or whatever he might
have. 2
Even though the purpose of Facenda's work with NFL films
may not have been for an advertisement, this statement indicates
that Facenda may have contemplated the promotion of products
through his work with NFL Films and, at the very least, had the
intent to further his career as a spokesperson, thus tipping the
scales in favor of preemption, because he intended to use his voice
in future advertisements.
C. Another Approach
Another approach, put forth by Professor Christina Bohannan,
suggests that certain modem contracts, if not preempted, threaten
game documentary. With regard to this factor the court cites its likeness to an
infomercial, but also cites the fact that it was only run three days before the
game came out. When examining the "products" that are involved, the
difference is the fact that NFL games are ongoing, whereas the game only
comes out on one day, once a year. Examined in this light, the running time for
both the initial documentaries and the documentary about the video game both
suit their respective products.
112. Facenda, v. NFL Films, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499 (E.D. Pa. 2007),
vacated by 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/5
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to disrupt the copyright system, stating that "[t]his contract regime
threatens to supplant a sizeable portion of the copyright regime"."'
Professor Bohannan suggests that the best way to view copyright
preemption of contracts is by using the law governing contractual
waivers of statutory rights." 4 The framework for applying this law
relates to contracts that are typically licenses, and sometimes
adhesion contracts, but the analysis works in Facenda as well." 5
The example Bohannan gives is this: a promise by the licensee not
to use a work in a way that would be permitted by the Copyright
Act." 6 Facenda does not contain a license agreement by a
copyright holder, but rather a waiver that is in the form of a
standard release contract, modifying the rights the NFL possessed
under their copyright." 7 The waiver gave the NFL all of the rights
to use the recordings of Facenda's voice, except to constitute an
endorsement of any product or service." 8 The following two-part
test should be applied in future cases similar to Facenda.
1. The ContractualWaiver Test
The test proposed by Professor Bohannan contains two parts. '9
Under this test, "[a] waiver is enforceable only if (1) it is 'clear
and unmistakable,' and (2) it waives a statutory right designed to
protect the interests of individual parties rather than the public."'2 °
Examples of these statutory rights designed to protect the public
are transformative uses that add "new expression, meaning, or
message."' 2 1 If this test is applied to the facts in Facenda, a very
different result is reached than the result of the court. The
contractual waiver of statutory rights test does not mention
commercial speech versus expression, so this test, as applied here,
would stand on its own.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Bohannan, supra note 2, at 616.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 649-50.
Id. at 649.
Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1022-23 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id.
Bohannan, supra note 2, at 649-50.
Id.
Id. at 651.
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a. Is the Waiver in the Release Contract "Clearand
Unmistakable?"
On its face, the Facenda waiver seems to be clear and
unmistakable, limiting its content to works that do not constitute
an endorsement of any product or service.' 22 However, when the
issue is examined more closely, the district court's analysis
presents an ambiguity that relates to the nature of the rights
waived. As mentioned above, there was controversy regarding
whether the splicing of the clips to create a promotion, or their use
in a work that has promotional qualities, violates the waiver."2 3
This has a direct relationship to the particular rights waived
because it determines in what type of derivative work the NFL can
engage, namely a splicing of Facenda's voice or the use of his
voice in films such as the one in question. Because of this
ambiguity, the waiver probably would not be enforceable based on
this prong of the test. But as the following analysis will show,
even if the first prong is met, the waiver falters on the second.
b. Is the Waived Statutory Right Designed to Protectthe
Public?
In order to determine the answer to this question, it is necessary
to examine what statutory right is being waived in Facenda. The
court concedes that the waiver gives up the right to make certain
derivative works.' 24 The court states that, "copyright law, taken in
isolation, gives [NFL Films] the exclusive right (absent a
limitation or exception) to use the sound recordings of Facenda's
voice in the way that it did."' 25 The scope and nature of this right
must now be examined in light of the contractual waiver test,
namely, whether it violated a right designed to protect the public.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the film documenting
the release of the Madden video game was an advertisement, and
that the waiver was effective, the waiver would limit the right of
122. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1022-23.
123. Facenda, v. NFL Films, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 491, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2007),
vacated by 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008).
124. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1026; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
125. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1026.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss1/5
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the NFL to make this type of derivative work. Based on the
guidelines of Professor Bohannan, the use of Facenda's voice in
the films adds new, transformative value, and therefore introduces
new expression to the public, expression that would be limited by
the waiver.
The purpose of copyright protection is not to protect the labor of
126
an individual author but rather to promote expression.
Commercial or not, the derivative work created by the NFL using
Facenda's voice added something to the public, regardless of
whether it was commercial in nature. Under this test, the Third
Circuit would likely reach a different conclusion, finding for
preemption.
D. Reconciling the Two Approaches
Given the lesser protection the First Amendment gives
commercial speech, it is not outlandish to claim the same for
copyrighted material. 127 But the Copyright Act protects expression
whether it is commercial or noncommercial. The two are not
128
mutually exclusive, as the Third Circuit in Facenda concedes.
But given the dormant copyright clause described in the dissent in
Wendt, and the fact that the contractual waiver test preempts all
state law that conflicts with the public policy of the Copyright Act,
the waiver test is preferable to the test used in Facenda. The
Nimmer approach attempts to reconcile the case law as it stands,
but as is clear by examining such cases, federal courts are nowhere
near a consensus. 29 If the advertising/expression dichotomy is to
126. Bohannan, supra note 2, at 617. "The balance of rights provided in the
Copyright Act is necessary to copyright's purpose of fostering the creation and
dissemination of expression." Id.
127. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1018 (rejecting the First Amendment Defense
based on the fact that the film in question was commercial speech).
128. Id. Although the court rejects the argument that the film regarding
Madden 06 is not commercial speech, it does respect those works that are "near
the line dividing commercial and noncommercial speech." Id.
129. Compare White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th
Cir. 1992) (right to publicity held not to have been preempted by the First
Amendment even though the infringement did not even involve plaintiffs
likeness) with Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805
F.2d 663, 679 (7th Cir. 1986) (copyright law pre-empted players' right to
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continue, it should always be supplemented with the analysis
advocated by Bohannan, to make sure the purpose of the
Copyright Act- benefiting creativity for the public- is preserved.
V. CONCLUSION

This article attempts to navigate a confusing area of the law, one
in which courts have been unable to agree. The old equivalence
test is hard to abandon, in part because it works in so many
situations, and also because it flows directly from the language of
the statute. 130 For this reason, even though it is unworkable in
some instances, it still will probably be applied in all types of
preemption cases.
Either the second approach the Facenda court sets forth, the
implied conflict pre-emption analysis, or the test set out by
Professor Bohannan, is preferable to a rigid express preemption
analysis for these cases.
The Third Circuit's approaches
acknowledge that there are competing interests between federal
copyright law and state law, and attempt to resolve them as not to
upset a delicate balance between the two, while at the same time
following binding precedent. '' But while the court's test is
required to reconcile varying case law, such precedent does not
weigh down Professor Bohannan's approach.
This article proposes that the contractual waiver of statutory
rights test be adopted because it more adequately protects the
rights of the public, which is the purpose of the Copyright Act.
The second prong of the test specifically addresses the problem
involved in Facenda, and provides a clear answer to the problem
based on the statute and the Constitution, ironically a more
accurate result than the rigid express preemption approach.
Regardless of whether speech is commercial or noncommercial,
the Copyright Act serves to encourage expression, and, although it
may seem unfair given the waiver signed by the parties, under the
Copyright Act as it currently stands, Facenda's state law right of
publicity in the broadcast of baseball games).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
131. See generally Bohannan, supra note 2 (arguing that copyright law is a
delicate balance between competing interests, the copyright owners, the
individuals involved in licensing, and the public).
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publicity claim should have been preempted.
-DanielLano
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